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ABSTRACT
The Determinants and Dynamics of Cross Border Bank Loans in Turkey
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MA, Economics, Spring 2015
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Selc¸uk O¨zyurt
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In this study, I identify the determinants and dynamics of cross border bank loans
in Turkey. The used dataset includes the cross border loans of all banks in Turkey
between December 2002 and December 2014. Firstly, I determine the dynamics of cross
border bank loans on the basis of bank-specific, national and global liquidity indicators.
According to results, banks that have large size, high return on asset ratio, more credit
in their portfolio and low deposit ratio are borrowing more. Non-performing loan ratio
and capital structure of banks do not have significant effects on cross border bank
loans. Only BIST repo o/n interest rate among national variables has significant effect
on cross border bank loans. Real credit growth of banks in US and Euro Area, money
supply growth rate of four financial centers(US, EA, UK, Japan), and the balance
sheet size of Fed are the global determinants of cross border bank loans in Turkey.
Secondly, the lender banks’ characteristics are important with regards to vulnerability
and affiliated loans have less vulnerable structure than non-affiliated loans. Thirdly, I
show that the sensitivity of cross border bank loans to some global factors decreased
after the last quarter of 2010 and hence macro-prudential policies in Turkey have been
successful to increase the resilience of Turkish economy to cross-border bank flows.
Lastly, I analyze the effects of Fed’s balance sheet, which is the indicator for quantitative
easing or expansionary monetary policies, on cross border bank loans in Turkey. Cross
border bank loans have increased significantly as a result of Fed’s quantitative easing
policies. These policies also have significant effect on each cross-border bank loan types.
The types of credit, repo, deposits, syndicated and securitization are affected more by
quantitative easing policies, respectively. Moreover, banks that have relatively small
asset size, weak capital structure, low return on asset ratio and liquid asset ratio have
been affected more positively by the Fed’s quantitative easing policies. I conclude
that they could not borrow at the desired level during illiquid period due to their
underwhelming ratios, however they started to search for yield and borrow more easily
during liquid period due to the Fed’s quantitative easing policies.
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O¨ZET
Tu¨rkiye’de Banka Dıs¸ Borc¸larının Dinamikleri ve Belirleyicileri
Tanju C¸apacıog˘lu
Yu¨ksek Lisans, Ekonomi, Bahar 2015
Danıs¸man: Yrd. Doc¸ent Selc¸uk O¨zyurt
Anahtar Kelimeler yurt dıs¸ı banka borc¸ları, is¸tirak borc¸ları, makro ihtiyati
politikalar, nicel genis¸leme, panel veri tahmini
Bu c¸alıs¸mada, Tu¨rkiye’de faaliyet go¨steren bankaların yurt dıs¸ından temin ettik-
leri borc¸ların dinamikleri belirlenmektedir. Kullanılan veri seti, 2002 Aralık ile 2014
Aralık tarihleri arasında dıs¸ borcu bulunan tu¨m bankaları kapsamaktadır. O¨ncelikle
banka bazlı, u¨lkesel ve ku¨resel go¨stergeler c¸erc¸evesinde banka dıs¸ borc¸larının belirleyi-
cileri ortaya konmaktadır. Sonuc¸lara go¨re bu¨yu¨k bankalar ile yu¨ksek aktif karlılık ve
kredi rasyosu ile du¨s¸u¨k mevduat rasyosuna sahip bankaların daha fazla borc¸landıkları,
takip oranı ve sermaye yapılarının ise anlamlı bir etkisinin olmadıg˘ı ortaya konmak-
tadır. U¨lkesel deg˘is¸kenler ic¸erisinde sadece BIST repo gecelik faiz oranı banka dıs¸
borc¸ları u¨zerinde anlamlı bir etkiye sahiptir. ABD ve Euro Bo¨lgesi’ndeki bankaların
reel kredi bu¨yu¨me hızları, do¨rt finansal merkezin(ABD, I˙ngiltere, Euro Blgesi, Japonya)
para arzının bu¨yu¨me hızı ve Fed’in aktif bu¨yu¨klu¨g˘u¨ banka dıs¸ borc¸larının ku¨resel be-
lirleyicileridir. I˙kinci olarak ise borc¸ alan bankanın ortaklık yapısında bulunan yabancı
bankadan temin edilen borc¸ların, ortaklık yapısında bulunmayan yabancı bankadan
alınan borc¸lardan daha az kırılgan bir yapıya sahip oldug˘u go¨sterilmektedir. U¨c¸u¨ncu¨
olarak ise 2010 yılının son c¸eyreg˘inden itibaren Tu¨rkiye’de uygulanmaya bas¸lanan makro
ihtiyati politikalar ile Tu¨rkiye Ekonomisi’nin banka dıs¸ borc¸ akımlarına olan duyarlılıg˘ının
azaldıg˘ı ve so¨z konusu politikaların Tu¨rkiye Ekonomisinin banka dıs¸ borc¸ akımlarına
kars¸ı direncini artırma konusunda bas¸arılı oldug˘u go¨sterilmis¸tir. Son olarak, parasal
genis¸lemenin go¨stergesi olan ABD Merkez Bankasının bilanc¸o bu¨yu¨klu¨g˘u¨ndeki deg˘is¸imlerin,
dig˘er bir ifade ile parasal genis¸leme politikalarının Tu¨rkiye’de faaliyet go¨steren bankaların
dıs¸ borc¸larına ve borc¸ tu¨rlerine etkisi incelenmis¸tir. Parasal genis¸leme politikalarının dıs¸
borc¸ları anlamlı s¸ekilde artırdıg˘ı, borc¸ tu¨ru¨ bazında en fazla etkinin sırasıyla kredi, repo,
mevduat, sendikasyon ve seku¨ritizasyon gruplarında yas¸andıg˘ı go¨ru¨lmu¨s¸tu¨r. Ayrıca
ku¨resel likiditenin nispeten sınırlı oldug˘u do¨nemlerde istedig˘i o¨lc¸u¨de borc¸lanamayan
ku¨c¸u¨k, sermaye yapısı zayıf, aktif karlılıg˘ı ve likit aktif rasyosu go¨rece du¨s¸u¨k bankaların
nicel genis¸leme programlarından daha fazla etkilendig˘i ve parasal genis¸leme sonucu
gevs¸eyen ku¨resel likidite kos¸ullarında daha fazla borc¸lanabildikleri sonucuna varılmıs¸tır.
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1 Introduction
Global banks and financial institutions have significantly increased their interna-
tional activities for over the last twenty years. After increasing their international ac-
tivities, financial integration have also deepened and gained strength globally. However,
this rising trend was interrupted with the financial crisis in 2008, and the increasing
globalization and financial integration resulted in a lot of debates in the banking sec-
tor. An important part of the discussion focused on the effects of capital flows from
advanced countries to emerging countries. According to the survey, made by Gold-
berg (2009), until the global financial crisis in 2008, it was accepted that the entry of
foreign banks in the local banking system enables a lot of advantages such as the bal-
ancing of the national market and more efficient use of resources. Mishkin (2009) stated
that globalization and financial integration also provide institutional and regulatory or
supervisory improvements, which are the prerequisites for economic development and
strong economy. However, this process worked in the opposite direction during the
global financial crisis, and vulnerabilities in the international financial markets have
spread to the emerging countries due to great changes in capital flows.
The trade linkages between countries, especially for advanced and emerging coun-
tries, hold a crucial place in the spread of crisis. However, after increasing financial
integration in the last two decades, financial linkages also started to play a crucial role
in the contagion of crisis. Especially after 2008 financial crisis, problems experienced
in the advanced countries spread out to emerging markets very quickly via those finan-
cial linkages. Many emerging countries like Turkey are in need of advanced countries’
saving funds to sustain economic growth. Also, capital flows from advanced to emerg-
ing countries deleveraged very sharply during global financial crisis. That is, emerging
countries try to borrow more on cross border loans but the structure of these loans is
very fragile. This situation increases the importance of financial linkages, and hence
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the role of cross border capital flows become more crucial in the spread of crisis.
Capital flows to emerging markets, including Turkey, may be in the forms of direct
investment, portfolio investment, bank loans and debt securities. Sharp declines were
experienced during global financial crisis, in spite of the fact that all types of capital
flows that have occurred from advanced countries to emerging countries in Asia, Latin
America and Europe had been increasing significantly for over the last twenty years
(Graph 1). The most significant decrease was experienced in the cross border bank
loans among all types of capital flows (Graph 2). Therefore, the effectiveness of global
linkages between banks in the spread of crisis was emphasized in the World Economic
Outlook report, prepared by IMF in 2009.
This paper aims to contribute to the literature on the determinants of cross border
bank loans in Turkey by using bank level dataset. Most of the studies in the literature
are in the cross country level instead. With the help of bank level data, I add bank-
specific variables to the regression models and be able to separate the effects of bank-
specific, national and global variables. Moreover, my dataset contains loan types (such
as credit, deposit, syndicated), and hence I am able to analyze each of the research
questions from the loan type perspective. Besides, use of micro level data instead of
aggregate data will enable us to derive more powerful and consistent results. Secondly,
with the help of bank level dataset, I separate affiliated and non-affiliated cross border
bank loans. Affiliated loans are provided by the foreign partner of borrower banks.
Foreign partner may have some specific information about borrower bank, and then
may continue to extent loans. Moreover, due to financial frictions in the recipient
country, there may be some restrictions for intra-bank capital flows. Hence, there are
some differences between affiliated and non-affiliated loans especially during financial
stress or deleveraging periods. Therefore, I will try to analyze to see whether the lender
banks’ characteristics are important or not with regards to vulnerability. Thirdly, I
analyze whether macro-prudential policies (implemented since late 2010) in Turkey
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could increase or not the resilience of Turkish economy to cross-border bank flows.
Lastly, I identify the effects of the Fed’s quantitative easing programs on cross border
bank loans in Turkey.
Turkey has experienced a significant increase in foreign liabilities of the banking
sector especially after 2002. The amount of banking sector’s foreign liabilities has
increased by thirteen times and reached to USD 140 billion during that period. The
effects of global crisis were also observed in the cross border bank loans in Turkey and
it was contracted by roughly 20 percent from the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in
September 2008 to April 2009. However, this contraction implies two possible cases.
In the first case, banks might not roll over their loans at the desired level during that
period, which shows that banks had difficulties to obtain funds from abroad due to
deleveraging activities of global banks. Secondly, for the sake of being cautious, those
banks might have preferred not to borrow at the previous level on purpose. Although
we do not know the actual reasons at this point, it is also a fact that the amount of
loans were contracted by roughly 20 percent in a very short time and it was affected
from global conditions very quickly. Therefore, in order to understand and assess the
vulnerabilities of capital flows more accurately, it is important to identify the dynamics
of expansion and contraction experienced in cross border loans. That objective is the
main and primary purpose of this thesis. In the framework of aforementioned objective,
the determinants and dynamics of cross border bank loans will be identified on the basis
of bank-specific, national and global liquidity indicators.
Furthermore, most banks started to operate outside of their country as a result
of increased financial integration. Especially, banks from advanced countries have ex-
tended their operations to other countries by way of getting into a partnership with
local banks, acquiring shares in them or getting license to operate through branches. 37
out of 49 banks that are currently operating in Turkey have a foreign partnership. It is
also fact that some of the cross border bank loans were borrowed from foreign partners
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of the borrower banks. The changes in cross-border banking loans and affiliated loans,
including claims by either branches or subsidiaries operating in the borrower countries,
may not have the same path during global financial crisis. Loans may behave differ-
ently depending on their types, and it is necessary to separate them in order to examine
the details of each loan type. Cerutti and Claessens (2013) stated that affiliated loans
behaved differently during global financial crisis. Cerutti, Hale and Minoiu (2014) also
analyzed the structure of syndicated loans, one of cross border loan types, and the
findings are in line with affiliated loans. Therefore, it is very crucial to divide cross
border bank loans in Turkey into two as affiliated and non-affiliated. Then, I will try
to analyze to see whether the lender banks’ characteristics are important or not with
regards to vulnerability. This will be the second objective of this study.
After the beginning and spreading of the global financial crisis in 2008, new policy
framework was developed to eliminate systemic risks and thereby to prevent the conta-
gion effects of unfavorable financial conditions to all economies. In order to reduce the
negative effects induced from the volatility in capital flows, Turkey has implemented
certain macro-prudential policies since the last quarter of 2010. Targeting financial
stability with price stability, interest rate corridor and reserve option mechanism are
some of the examples of those policies. Therefore, I examine whether macro-prudential
policies (implemented since late 2010) in Turkey could increase the resilience of Turkish
economy to cross-border bank flows. This will be the third objective of this study.
Central banks in many developed and developing countries primarily decreased in-
terest rates in order to eliminate the negative results of global financial crisis erupted
in 2008. However, due to lack of performance of those measures, central banks in de-
veloped countries were inclined to launch a quantitative easing process. The effects
of Feds non-traditional expansionary monetary policies on the capital flows and cross
border bank loans in emerging countries are within the hot discussion issues in recent
years. Therefore, analyzing the effects of Fed’s quantitative easing program on the cross
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border bank loans are also within the objectives of this study.
I analyzed the determinants of cross border bank loans in Turkey for the 2002 - 2014
period, using monthly data. The main findings can be summarized as follows: The main
determinants can be summarized into three groups. Bank specific determinants are
banks’ credit ratios, deposit ratios, return on asset ratios, non-performing loan ratios,
sizes and FX credit and deposit interest spreads. Monthly change in Istanbul Stock
Exchange over/night repo interest rate is the only indicator among national variables
that affect cross border bank loans. Global determinants are credit growth of banks in
US and Euro Area, money supply growth rate of four financial centers, and the balance
sheet size of Fed. I also show that there is no significant impact of non-performing loans
ratio and capital structure of banks on cross border bank loans as well as monetary
policy stance of Fed, global risk appetite, and risk perception towards emerging markets.
Secondly, I compared the vulnerabilities of affiliated and non-affiliated loans for the
pre-crisis and 2008 crisis periods. According to the results, the lender banks’ charac-
teristics with regards to vulnerability are important and affiliated loans have less vul-
nerable structure than non-affiliated loans. Thirdly, I test the effectiveness of Turkey’s
macro-prudential policies in respect of volatility in bank flows. Results show that the
impacts of global liquidity indicators on bank flows are diminished and the new pol-
icy framework in Turkey has been successful within the frame of protecting Turkish
economy from the sharp volatile bank flows. Lastly, I analyze the effects of Fed’s quan-
titative easing programs on the cross border bank loans in Turkey. According to the
results, quantitative easing programs increased cross border bank loans in Turkey. The
types of credit, repo, deposits, syndication and securitization were affected more from
the quantitative easing programs, respectively. Moreover, banks, which have relatively
small asset size, weak capital structure, low return on assets and liquid assets ratios
were affected more positively from the changes in the Fed’s balance sheet size because
they could not borrow at the desired level during illiquid periods but they started to
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borrow more easily in the liquid environment, which was the result of Fed’s quantitative
easing programs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the existing
literature related with cross border bank flows and financial crisis. Section 3 reviews
the stylized facts on cross-border bank flows to Turkey. In this section, some facts are
given, such as the distribution and features of all types of cross-border loans over time
basis (i.e. maturity, counterparty country distribution, distribution of currency types).
Also, the Section 4 gives information about the structure of dataset and specifies the
model. Section 5 summarizes the empirical results for each research question. Section
6 concludes.
2 Cross-Border Bank Flows and Financial Crisis: A
Literature Review
The trade linkages before the increase of financial integration were seen, in the
related literature, as the main determinant of how shocks are transmitted from advanced
to emerging markets (Glick and Rose, 1998). Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996)
showed the importance of international trade linkages for the contagion effect using the
datasets of 20 developed countries. Following the ever increasing financial integration
in the last two decades, the importance of financial linkages was also detected for
contagion effects and researchers began to analyze whether financial linkages affect
capital flows or not. Kaminski and Reinhart (2000) analyzed the impacts of trade
linkages and financial linkages considering the role of cross border bank lending and the
potential of cross market hedging. They concluded that financial linkages, which were
neglected up to that time, have more important role than trade linkages in explaining
the contagion effects across countries. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2003) also analyzed
importance of financial linkages with the panel study for 11 creditor countries and 30
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emerging countries. According to their results, common bank lenders had played an
important role in transmitting the crises which were occurred in emerging markets such
as Mexican, Russian and Asian markets that are especially vulnerable. However, Forbes
and Chinn (2009) found that despite the deepening financial integration and growth
in global financial flows in the last decades, bilateral trade flows are still significant
and robust determinants of how shocks are transmitted from developed to emerging
markets. Caramazza, Ricci and Salgado (2004) and Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2008)
also supported the importance of financial linkages in contagion of crisis and they
stated that financial linkages are also major significant determinants of how shocks are
transmitted from advanced to emerging markets as well as trade linkages. Moreover,
Hernandez, Mellado and Valds (2001) considered stronger financial integration as a
latent cause in explaining why contagion was more crucial during the 1990s than the
earlier crises. In summary, not only trade, but also bank lending channel is a crucial
factor in explaining the contagion effect.
The classical push and pull factors are the main determinants of cross-border bank
flows in the literature. The push factors are related with the external common condi-
tions that mobilize loan flows. The pull factors are related with the country specific
or bank specific factors that attract loan flows. According to literature, solid macro-
fundamentals (such as strong growth outlook, high interest rate differential, efficient
debt management and low and stable inflation) and structural backgrounds (such as
benevolent financial system infrastructure, improved governance, transparency and rule
of law) determine the pull factors in loan flows. If pull factors are effective to attract
loan flows, then potential macro-financial imbalances caused by these loan flows could
be limited by an appropriate design of policies in the borrower country. Jeanneau and
Micu (2002) showed that push and pull factors determine international bank lending.
Garcia-Herrero and Martinez-Peria (2005) and Hernandez et al. (2001) analyzed the
cross-country determinants of cross border bank loans and they found that borrower
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countries’ conditions are the robust and significant determinants of cross border lend-
ing. Goldberg (2001) showed the impact of lender countries’ conditions on cross-border
lending. In addition to lender and borrower countries’ conditions, Papaioannou (2008)
showed the importance of institutional, geographical and historical drivers.
Despite the shortage of empirical works on the determinants of cross-border bank
flows to emerging markets in periods of crises, studies in this area has been increasing
in recent years. These empirical works are focused on two basic areas. In the first
area, researchers try to analyze changes in international bank activities using BIS data
around the periods of financial stress. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) found that lending
supply in emerging markets was affected through three separate channels which are a
contraction in direct cross-border lending by foreign banks; a contraction in local lending
by foreign banks’ affiliates in emerging markets; and a contraction in lending supply by
domestic banks as well as a result of the funding shock to their balance sheet induced by
the decline in interbank or cross-border lending. That paper also constitutes the basics
of many studies made after crisis. There are other empirical works related with this
area, such as McGuire and von Peter (2009), Cull and Martinez Peria (2012), Claessens
and van Horen (2013). Cull and Martinez Peria (2012) found that although cross border
lending fell by more than domestic private bank credit in Eastern Europe, the opposite
is true in Latin America due to regulatory requirements in there. Claessens and van
Horen (2013) examined the role of ”competitor remoteness”, which is the weighted
average distance of all competing banks to a host country, on the location decision of a
foreign bank.
In the second area, the determinants of cross border lending are analyzed at the
micro level. Giannetti and Laeven (2012a) and De Haas and Van Horen (2013) found a
robust and significant negative effect of geographical distance on lending stability during
the crisis, which was also reported as flight home or flight to core markets. Ongena,
Peydro and van Horen (2012) analyzed bank and firm level data, and found that the
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lending desires of internationally borrowing banks and foreign banks reduced more than
domestically funded banks. And De Haas and Van Horen (2012) found the negative
effect of funding shocks on the supply of cross-border lending during the crisis. They
also showed that banks affected negatively from these shocks restricted their lending
especially to small borrowers. Kapan and Minoiu (2013) also found that banks with
strong balance sheets and less dependent to international funding were better able to
maintain lending during the crisis.
There are also many studies in order to analyze the dynamics of cross-border lending
in the literature. Most of these studies depend on a cross country sample and use the
country specific panel method. Although it varies from study to study, in many cases,
macroeconomic indicators of borrower and lender countries, global liquidity indicators
and bilateral information between borrower and lender countries (such as distance, trade
volume, common language and common history) are added to models to determine the
dynamics of cross border lending. In addition to these variables, some indexes developed
by the World Bank or other institutions, such as regulatory quality or financial openness,
are also added. Herrmann and Mihaljek (2010) evaluated the cross border lending
within the frame of gravity model, which depends on the bilateral distance between
borrower and lender countries. They found that variables related with gravity models
such as distance have significant effect on cross border lending. Bremus and Fratzscher
(2014) analyzed the effect of quantitative easing programs, implemented by the Fed
and ECB after financial crisis, and found that expansionary monetary policies have
a positive effect on cross border lending. Cerutti, Hale and Minoiu (2014) examined
the drivers of cross border credit flows, distinguishing between syndicated and non-
syndicated, and they found that banks with a weak capital structure favor syndicated
over other types of cross border bank loans. Cerutti, Claessens and Ratnovski (2014)
analyzed the cross border bank loans within the frame of global liquidity indicators.
They used the indicators of four financial centers, which are United States, United
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Kingdom, Euro Area and Japan. With the help of those indicators, they captured the
risk appetite, monetary policy stance and credit conditions of these countries, and then
they found that European banks have a dominant role in cross border lending. They
also showed that cross border lending is driven primarily by monetary stance of US and
credit conditions of Euro Area. Shirota (2015) also examined the determinants of cross
border lending, and found that main determinants are heterogeneous across countries.
In the literature, affiliated loans and foreign bank affiliates have become popular in
recent years. Cerutti and Claessens (2013) separated cross border loans as affiliated and
non-affiliated. They tested whether the affiliated loans are different or not with regards
to vulnerability during global financial crisis. According to their findings, affiliated
loans decreased by only 5 percent, compared to 23 percent in total cross border bank
loans. They also reconfirmed the importance of supply side factors. Although there are
many empirical studies in the related literature, the number of theoretical studies, such
as Bruno and Shin (2013a), is very few. They developed a model of credit allocation of
international banks, centralized funding and global banking, and showed the leverage
cycles of global banks’ contributions and interactions of borrower country and domestic
banks characteristics. Bruno and Shin (2013b) tested their model empirically in order to
determine whether macro-prudential policies have been effective in Korea against cross-
border capital flows after the end of 2010. Aysan, Fendoglu and Kilinc (2013) applied
the model of Bruno and Shin to Turkey and they tested whether macro-prudential
policies have been effective in Turkey. They showed the effectiveness of macro prudential
policies, implemented by Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey since late 2010.
My paper expands on and complements these papers in four ways. First, although
most of the studies in the literature are in cross country level, my study uses bank
level dataset. With the help of bank level data, I add bank-specific variables to the
regression models and be able to separate the effects of bank-specific, national and global
variables. Secondly, I separate affiliated and non-affiliated cross border loans, and by
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this way I try to analyze whether the lender banks’ characteristics are important or not
with regards to vulnerability. Thirdly, my dataset contains different loan types (such
as credit, deposit, syndicated), and hence I am able to analyze each of the research
questions from the loan type perspective. Lastly, use of micro-level data instead of
aggregate data enable me to derive more powerful and consistent results.
3 Stylized Facts on Cross-Border Bank Loans in
Turkey
In order to understand and assess the vulnerabilities of capital flows more accurately,
I will discuss the components and development of Turkish Banks’ cross-border loans
in this section. The amount of cross-border loans of Turkish Banks has entered into
an increasing trend in the last decade (Graph 3). While the level of this amount was
USD 10.79 billion in 2002, the level of loans increased approximately thirteen times and
reached to the USD 140.89 billion as of December 2014. When we look at the details
of that trend, it is seen the negative effects of the global financial crisis in 2008 and
Eurozone debt crisis in 2011 on the amount of cross-border loans. While the level is
about USD 68.11 billion at the end of 3rd quarter 2008 (the beginning of the global
crisis), it was contracted at the rate of 21.64 percent during the crisis and fell to USD
55.99 billion in April 2009. Similarly, after the Eurozone debt crisis, the level of amount
declined from the USD 98.86 billion to USD 95.00 billion. This period was very short
time which covers from July 2011 to the end of same year. As a result, cross border
bank loans are quite sensitive to global conditions and negative global conditions can
lead to sudden capital outflows.
Graph 4 shows the behavior of cross border loan types during the time period of
analysis, which are credit, deposit, credit for foreign trade finance, syndicated, secu-
ritization, repo and subordinated loans. Syndicated loans are provided by a group of
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lenders for a single borrower. The interest rate of sydicated loans can be fixed or float-
ing based on a benchmark rate such as Libor or Euribor. Because syndicated loans
are commonly larger than standard bank loans and the default risk of borrower could
cripple a single lender, it is provided by a group of lenders. Therefore, the main purpose
of syndicated loans is to spread the default risk of borrower across multiple lenders. Se-
curitization loans are provided by third party investors in return for the various types
of contractual debt (such as auto loans, residential mortgages, commercial mortgages
or credit card debt obligations). Subordinated loans are repayable after other debts
have been paid if a bank falls into bankruptcy or liquidation. Therefore, those loans
are more risky for the lenders. Since subordinated loans have a higher risky structure,
they also have higher yield than other debts.
Furthermore, the increasing trends of banking loan types are very similar to the
trend of cumulative loan. The biggest share, which reached to 55.04 percent at the
end of 2014, belongs to credit during all period. There are there important points in
that graph. First, the shares of repo, syndicated loans and deposits have increased
since global financial crisis and the share of repo have become the second largest group
after May 2011. Secondly, although the shares of credit and securitization became
equal in the June 2007, the share of securitization loans has gradually decreased since
that time. Thirdly, after December 2008, the subordinated loans can be used in the
calculation of capital adequacy ratio and banks have started borrowing in the form of
subordinated loans. The amount of subordinated loans has reached to USD 9.77 billion
as of December 2014.
The rollover ratio is also crucial indicator for cross border loans because if that ratio
drops below 100 percent, then it implies that the amount of new loans fall behind of
the repayment amount. And we can conclude that banks have a difficulty finding new
loans to roll over their matured loans. This ratio had last dropped below 100 percent in
2009 but has been above 100 percent since then, showing that even during periods when
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banks’ conjectural risk perceptions were heightened, they did not have any difficulty
rolling over their debts (Graph 5).
Cross-border loans of Turkish Banks are usually in the form of TL, USD, and EUR.
The share of these currency types in total loans usually remains unchanged within the
98 percent band. As of January 2005, USD, EUR and TL’s shares were 79.85, 12.97
percent, and 5.19 percent, respectively, and these shares were sharply changed up to
2010. In this period, despite the decrease of USD’s share, the share of EUR increased.
In particular, it is seen that the banks borrow more in EUR after the 2008 global
financial crisis. As of October 2014, USD, EUR and TL’s shares were 64.02, 25.86, and
8.17 percent, respectively (Graph 6).
Graph 7 shows the loan shares of some important regions, which are Euro Area,
USA, United Kingdom, Japan and Gulf countries. Banks operating in Turkish financial
system are generally borrowing from global banks based on Euro Area and USA. The
total share of those two regions was 59.73 percent as of December 2002 and it reached
to 60.97 percent, which is very close the previous one, at the end of 2014. After
global financial crisis, the share of Euro Area started to decrease and that part was
compensated with banks or financial institutions in United Kingdom.
4 Data and Methodology
This chapter presents the dataset, the model and the methodology to analyze deter-
minants and dynamics of cross border bank loans in Turkey. Section 4.1 summarizes the
features of used dataset. Definitions of variables are also given in this section. Section
4.2 gives the base model used in this thesis.
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4.1 Data Set and Definition of Variables
The data about the cross-border loans of banks operating in Turkish banking system
are held by the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT). In this study, I use
the dataset which includes cross border loans of all banks operating in Turkey. This
dataset has a monthly frequency, and covers the period of December 2002 and December
2014. It includes loan details that are borrowed by Turkish banks from approximately
139 countries in forms of credit, deposit, credit for foreign trade finance, syndicated,
securitization, repo and subordinated loans. The amount, currency type, interest rate,
starting date and maturity date of loans are also available in the dataset. In addition
to these, the dataset also includes the information of borrower banks, lender banks and
lender country. Furthermore, the amount of loans can be created as flow or stock.
Analysis is based on the data of biggest 19 deposit banks according to their asset
size due to the liquidation or merger of various banks during the time period of analysis.
The asset share of these banks constituted 96.21 percent of banking sector in Turkey as
of December 2014. Therefore, the presentation power of the sample is quite high. The
list of selected banks is presented in Table 1.
I categorize variables that have the potential to affect cross border bank loans as
bank-specific variables, macroeconomic indicators of Turkish Economy and global liq-
uidity indicators. Table 2 summarizes the definitions and sources of these variables.
Table 3 also summarizes the descriptive statistics of these variables such as average,
standard deviation, maximum and minimum values. Table 4 provides the correlations
between all variables which are used in regressions. Time series charts of the Turkish
Economy’s macroeconomic and global liquidity indicators are presented in Annex A.
However, because of the fact that bank-specific variables change from bank to bank, I
do not add their graphs to the annex.
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4.2 Model and Methodology
I used fixed effects and random effects panel estimation methods in this study due
to the structure of my dataset. Fixed effect models have fixed slopes within group, but
those fixed values change from group to group. Theoretical structure of the fixed effects
model is expressed as follows:
yi,t = αi + βi(X)i,t + ei,t (1)
and t=1,....,Ti
In the above equation; yi,t represents dependent variable and Xi,t also represents
explanatory variable vector. αi represents the fixed effects of banks included into anal-
ysis, (and is based on the assumption of there is differences between banks). βi is the
vector of explanatory variables’ coefficients.
In order to identify fixed effect, the following null hypothesis which states that there
is no difference between banks’ fixed effects is tested:
H0 : α1 = ... = αn = α (2)
In order to compare fixed and random effect models, I implement Hausman test and
could not detect random effects in the model.
In this framework, I analyze the determinants of cross border loans of banks op-
erating in Turkey for the period of December 2002 - December 2014 with the help of
fixed effects panel estimation method. The model includes the lagged values of the
explanatory variables in order to mitigate the potential endogeneity problem in the
analysis. Bruno and Shin (2013) used country specific and global factors in their model
as control variables, and they added all independent variables by lagging them one pe-
riod (they have a quarterly dataset) to reduce endogeneity concerns and maximize the
period coverage. Therefore, I aim to mitigate the potential endogeneity problem of the
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model by using one period lagged value of independent variables.
Selecting the lag length of independent variables is another issue has to be consid-
ered. In economic theory, amount of the loan depends not only the contemporaneous
indicators but also on past levels of those indicators. In panel data literature, although
various lagged values of dependent variables can be added to regression simultane-
ously, such use is not common for independent variables. In order to select the optimal
lag length, first, the model is regressed with different lag lengths consistent with the
economic intuition, and then optimal lag selection is done according to the statistical
significance level of the coefficients. Therefore, I add one, two and three period lagged
values of independent variables to the model and select the optimal lag length as one,
by comparing the statistical significance levels.
Licb,t = β0 + β1(Bank)i,t−1 + β2(TrMacro)t−1 + β3(Global)t−1
+ γi + αc + δb + εicb,t
(3)
where
Licb,t: Logarithmic value of bank i’s stock cross border loan at time t borrowed from
country c in loan type b,
(Bank)i,t−1: The value of bank specific variables of bank i at time t− 1,
(TrMacro)t−1: The value of Turkish Economy’s macroeconomic indicators at time
t− 1,
(Global)t−1: The value of global liquidity indicators at time t− 1,
γi: Fixed effect for bank i
αc: Fixed effect for country c
δb: Fixed effect for loan type b
The model above is based on fixed effects panel estimation method. In fact, I
use fixed effects and random effects models in my estimations, which are robust to
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heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The result of Hausman test is in favor of fixed
effects model, thus I only report fixed effect results except for section 5.2.
Dataset covers loan details of all Turkish banks in monthly frequency. In fact, it was
possible to aggregate loan amounts in basis of borrower bank or lender country. For
example, instead of using the amount of each loan type borrowed by each bank from
each country at any given time period, I could use the aggregated amounts on the basis
of banks or countries. However, I could not control the shocks occurred during the time
period of analysis or separate demand and supply side effects in case of aggregation.
Therefore, I use the value of bank i’s stock cross border loan at time t, which is borrowed
from country c in loan type b as a dependent variable. There is a crucial advantage
by doing so: I can add fixed effects for borrower bank, lender country and loan types
to model and hence control the shocks, which had occurred during the time period of
analysis. Especially, controlling the shocks in lender countries enables me to fix supply
side effects in cross border loans for Turkey.
In the literature, the classical push and pull factors are the main determinants of
the cross-border bank flows. Therefore, I add push and pull factors that can possibly
affect loan flows to the model. The push factors are related with the external common
conditions mobilizing loan flows. On the other hand, pull factors are more related with
the country specific or bank specific factors attracting loan flows. With the help of bank
level dataset, I add bank specific and macroeconomic indicators for Turkish economy
as pull factors. Moreover, I add global liquidity indicators as push factors.
I estimate the model with three different specifications. In the first specification I
analyze the relation between cross border bank loans and bank specific variables. The
bank specific variables used in the literature are the size, credit ratio, deposit ratio,
capital structure, operating performance (return on asset ratio), credit quality (non-
performing loan ratio) of banks. In addition to those variables, I also add the spread
between the interest rate of FX credit and FX deposits since it is a crucial indicator
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for policy makers.
In the second specification, I add macroeconomic indicators of Turkish Economy
as well as bank specific variables. The selected macroeconomic indicators are the real
gross domestic product growth rate, consumer price index growth rate (inflation rate),
Istanbul Stock Exchange over/night repo interest rate, real effective exchange rate and
credit default swap premiums. These variables control especially the demand side for
borrower banks.
In the third specification, I add global liquidity variables beside national and bank
specific factors. The main global liquidity indicators I used are summarized in the
study of Cerutti, Claessens and Ratnovski (2014). They stated that the factors no-
tably identified in the empirical literature are ’uncertainty and risk aversion’, ’funding
conditions for global banks’, ’money aggregates’ and ’monetary policies’ in the four
financial centers (United States, Euro Area, United Kingdom and Japan). According
to Bekaert, Hoerova and Lo Duca (2013), the uncertainty and risk aversion are driven
by risk attitudes of lenders and borrowers, macroeconomic fundamentals and possibly
the monetary stance of the four financial centers. Rey (2013) argued that US VIX,
which shows the volatility in ’Standard and Poors 500’, gives an idea about the uncer-
tainty and risk aversion, and in the empirical literature, it is commonly used to capture
global uncertainty and risk aversion. In addition to VIX, Emerging Markets Bond Index
(EMBI) also enables us to track the changes in the risk perception towards emerging
markets.
Furthermore, in order to capture the changes in funding conditions for global banks,
there are a lot of measures used in the empirical literature. Some of them are real credit
growth rate, bank leverage rate and TED spread, which is the difference between gov-
ernment bond rates and short term interbank market. Cerutti, Claessens and Ratnovski
(2014) found that the funding conditions of banks in Euro Area play a more crucial role
then the US banks in cross border lending. Therefore, I add real credit growth rate of
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banks in US and Euro Area to the model in order to capture the changes in funding
conditions for global banks. I also add money supply growth rate of aforementioned
four financial centers. I use the M2 statistics of United States, European Central Bank
and Japan as the money aggregates. Since M2 statistics is not explained in UK, I use
M3 statistics instead. Monetary stances of countries include the general level of policy
interest rates and the slope of yield curve. In order to capture the changes in monetary
stance of the Fed, I use the yield curve slope of US, which is the difference between
10 year and 3 month US Treasury bill yields. In addition to those factors, I also add
the balance sheet size of the Fed. To our common knowledge, the quantitative easing
policies of US have been one of the main sources of excess global liquidity, especially
after the recent global financial crisis. Therefore, controlling the balance sheet size of
the Fed is also crucial since the Feds non-traditional expansionary monetary policies
have been one of the main determinants of the last decade.
I use the variable that shows the size of bank in logarithm. The expected sign
of banks’ sizes is positive since bigger banks might be more inclined to borrow from
abroad. Credits require funds for banks, thus the expected sign of banks’ credit ratio
is positive. However, deposits are the main funding sources for banks, and decrease
in the deposits leads bank to obtain more foreign funds. Therefore, the expected sign
of banks’ deposit ratio is negative. I use the ratio of paid capital to total assets in
order to capture the changes in banks’ capital structures. Increase in that ratio also
decreases the necessity of foreign fund sources, and it is expected that capital ratio is
negatively related with cross border bank loans like deposit ratio. Return on asset and
non-performing loan ratios show the quality of credits and management performance
for each bank. Banks that have high return on assets ratio and low non-performing loan
ratio will be more proactive in the sector, and we expect that such banks are growing
more rapidly. In order to grow more rapidly, banks require domestic and foreign funds.
The expected sign of return on asset ratio and non-performing loan ratio are positive
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and negative, respectively. The spread increases when the increase in FX credit interest
rate exceeds the increase in FX deposit interest rate. This case also implies an increase
in credit risk in the country. The contraction in cross border borrowing in the case of
increasing credit risk implies two possibilities. In the first case, banks might not roll
over their loans at the desired level during that period, which shows that banks had
difficulties to obtain funds from abroad due to deleveraging activities of global banks.
On the other hand, for the sake of being cautious, those banks might have preferred
not to borrow at the previous level on purpose. Therefore, the expected sign of spread
between interest rate of FX credit and FX deposit is ambiguous.
Because gross domestic product(GDP) value of Turkey is explained quarterly and
the dataset used in this study has a monthly frequency, I use monthly changes of
industrial production index, which is a powerful proxy for GDP, instead of GDP. The
expected signs of change in industrial production index and inflation are positive and
negative, respectively, since these factors represent the demand side, and improvements
in these factors provide a more favorable investment environment. That also leads to
increase in the activities of banking sector such as giving more credits. Increase in the
change of interest rate as regards to previous month and decrease in the risk premium
of Turkey create an incentive for investors to lend more to Turkey. Therefore the
expected signs of Istanbul Stock Exchange over/night interest rate and credit default
swap premiums are positive and negative, respectively.
VIX and EMBI enable us to capture the changes in uncertainty and risk aversion,
thus the expected signs of VIX and EMBI are negative. To our common knowledge,
banks lend long term and borrow short term. Hence, when the yield curve becomes flat,
their domestic investment opportunities become less profitable, and this may canalize
banks to search for yield like cross border bank loans. Therefore, the expected sign of
the slope of US yield curve is also negative. The expected signs of credit growth rate
of banks in US and Euro Area are positive since those factors reflect the willingness to
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take risks in cross border lending. Because the quantitative easing policies of US have
been one of the main sources of excess global liquidity especially after the recent global
financial crisis and that excess global liquidity has triggered the flows from advanced
to emerging countries, the expected sign of the Fed’s balance sheet size is also positive.
5 The Empirical Results
5.1 Determinants of Cross Border Bank Loans in Turkey
To begin with, I add the bank specific variables that can possibly affect loan flows to
the regressions in Table 5. In the first regression, I add the monthly dummy variables
to regression in order to control time shocks. Other models control bank type, lender
country type and loan type fixed effects as well as time fixed effects, respectively. For
example; the fourth model controls time, borrower bank, lender country and loan type
shocks, and could control supply side completely with the help of those fixed effects.
In the sixth model, I control time and country fixed effects as a group in order to
control shocks stemmed from lender countries in a monthly basis. Therefore, sixth
model presents the results in cases where supply side is controlled very strictly.
According to the regression results of fourth model in which all fixed effects are
included, the signs of all explanatory variables used in the model appear to be in the
expected direction. Large banks and banks that have a high return on asset ratios
are borrowing more. In addition, banks that have more credits in their portfolio are
borrowing more from abroad. I also find that there is no significant impact of non-
performing loan ratio and capital structure of bank on cross border bank loans, and
there is a negative relation between deposits and cross border borrowing. Moreover,
there is also a negative relation between cross border borrowing and the spread between
interest rates of FX credit and FX deposit. The spread increases when the increase in
FX credit interest rate exceeds the increase in FX deposit interest rate. That case
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also implies an increase in credit risk in the country. The contraction in cross border
borrowing in the case of increasing credit risk implies two possibilities. In the first case,
banks might not roll over their loans at the desired level during that period, which shows
that banks had difficulties to obtain funds from abroad due to deleveraging activities
of global banks. Conversely, for the sake of being cautious, those banks might have
preferred not to borrow at the previous level on purpose. However, because I control
the shocks stemmed from lender countries, I show that negative relation between cross
border borrowing and the spread is the result of second case. Therefore, I conclude
that banks have preferred not to borrow at the previous level on purpose for the sake
of being cautious. All these relations are also significant at 1 percent level.
In Table 6, in addition to bank specific variables, I also add macroeconomic indi-
cators of Turkish economy that can possibly affect loan flows as control variables. All
regressions include borrower bank, lender country and loan type fixed effects with a
constant term. Because gross domestic product value of Turkey is explained quarterly
and the dataset used in this study has a monthly frequency, I used industrial production
index instead of GDP, which is a powerful proxy for GDP. According to the results,
bank-specific variables have a significant positive impact on the cross border bank loans
at 1 percent level, which is similar to the results of Table 5. The changes in Istanbul
Stock Exchange over/night repo interest rates and credit default swap(CDS) premi-
ums have also significant effects on cross border bank loans. Increase in the change of
interest rates and decrease in the CDS premiums lead to increase in the cross border
loans. The explanation might be that increase in the change of interest rate as regards
to previous month and decrease in the risk premium of Turkey create an incentive for
investors to lend more to Turkey. However, other macroeconomic indicators of Turkish
economy do not have significant impact on cross border bank loans. This may be due
to the high sensitivity of financial sector to the changes in macroeconomic indicators.
Therefore, when I add macroeconomic indicators with bank specific variables to the
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model, I can capture the effects of the changes in economy by the way of bank specific
variables.
In Table 7, in addition to bank specific variables and macroeconomic indicators of
Turkish economy, I also add global liquidity indicators that can possibly affect loan flows
as control variables. All regressions include borrower bank, lender country and loan
type fixed effects with a constant term. The bank-specific variables have a significant
positive impact on the cross border bank loans at 1 percent level, which is similar to
the results of Table 5. The signs of all global liquidity indicators used in the model
appear to be in the expected direction. Due to high correlation between EMBI and
VIX, I add them to the regressions separately. According to seventh regression in which
all explanatory variables are added to model, real credit growth of banks in US and
Euro Area, the money supply growth rate of aforementioned four financial centers and
the balance sheet size of the Fed have significant effects on cross border bank loans in
Turkey.
However, monetary stance of the Fed(yield curve slope), global risk appetite(VIX),
and risk perception towards emerging markets(EMBI) do not have a significant effect
on cross border loans. Especially after global financial crisis, the policy rate of Fed
converged to zero level and changes in funding rate of Fed have been limited since
global financial crisis. That fact may be the reason of why monetary stance of the Fed
does not have a significant effect on cross border loans. On the other hand, VIX and
EMBI are the crucial indicators for global risk appetite, and one reason why the risk
appetite indicators do not have a significant effect on cross border loans may be that
Turkish banks also issue bonds for foreign investors to obtain funds, and the amount
of bonds issued by banks for foreign investors are excluded from my analysis. To our
common knowledge, the investors of bonds are more sensitive to the changes in VIX
and EMBI. However as long as those indicators go around within the narrow interval,
they may not have significant effect on cross border bank loans.
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The real credit growth of US and Euro Area are also crucial parameters in related
literature because these variables describe the funding conditions for global banks.
Cerutti, Claessens and Ratnovski (2014) analyzed the cross border bank loans within
the frame of global liquidity indicators, and they found that European banks have a
dominant role in cross border lending and it is driven primarily by monetary stance
of US and credit conditions of Euro Area. Table 7 shows that real credit growth in
banks of US and Euro Area have positive effects on cross border bank loan in Turkey,
which is also consistent with the related literature. Not to mention the 40 percent of
cross border bank loans in Turkey have been borrowed from Europen banks, and hence
Turkish banks are more sensitive to the developments in European banking sector.
Hahm, Shin and Shin (2013) and Chung, Lee, Loukoianova, Park and Shin (2014)
state that the growth in some components of broad money measures, such as wholesale
or non-financial enterprises’ deposits, can complement leverage measures in explaining
bank risk as they indicate the relative ease of funding conditions. In the light of that
argument, I expect that increase in money supply leads to increase in cross border bank
loans, which is also consistent with my results.
The balance sheet size of the Fed is also consequential due to quantitative easing
program implemented after the end of 2008. After that expansionary monetary policy,
global liquidity increased and moved to especially emerging markets such as Turkey.
That relation between the balance sheet size of the Fed and cross border bank loans will
be analyzed more deeply in Section 5.4. All these relations are significant at 1 percent
level.
As a result, the main determinants can be summarized into three groups. Bank
specific determinants are banks’ credit ratios, deposit ratios, return on asset ratios,
sizes and FX credit and deposit interest spreads. Monthly change in Istanbul Stock
Exchange repo interest rate is the only indicator among national variables that affects
cross border bank loans. Global determinants are real credit growth of banks in US
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and Euro Area, money supply growth rate of four financial centers, and the balance
sheet size of the Fed. Results also indicate that there is significant impact of neither
non-performing loan ratios and capital structures of banks nor the monetary policy
stance of the Fed, global risk appetite, and risk perception towards emerging markets
on cross border bank loans in Turkey.
Moreover, I look at the relative economic significance of variables on cross border
bank loans by running standardized regression in which the coefficients shows the impact
of a one standard deviation change in an explanatory variable on the dependent variable.
Therefore, the magnitude of standardized coefficients has become comparable. The
second column of Table 8 reports these standardized coefficients and the third and
fourth columns sort out these variables according to their economic significance, where
the ordering is based on the absolute value of the standardized coefficients, which are
statistically significant at 1 percent level. The third column sorts out these coefficients
according to their groups. The most economically significant variable is the size of
banks, the second one is the credit ratio of banks, third one is the balance sheet size of
the Fed, the fourth one is deposit ratio of banks, the fifth one is real credit growth of
banks in Euro Area, the sixth one is the spread between the interest rate of FX credit
and FX deposit, the seventh one is return on asset ratio of banks, the eighth one is real
credit growth of banks in Unites States, and the last one is money supply growth rate
of four financial centers.
5.2 Are the lender banks’ characteristics important with re-
gards to vulnerability?
37 out of 49 banks that are currently operating in Turkey have a foreign partnership.
Banks can borrow from either foreign partners or any other financial institutions from
abroad. As I mentioned in the literature review section, Cerutti and Claessens (2013)
analyzed the behavior of cross-border bank loans and affiliated loans during financial
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crisis and Eurozone debt crisis. They found that while the amount of affiliated loans
decreased by 5 percent, the amount of all cross border bank loans decreased by 23
percent during global financial crisis. They concluded that affiliated loans had a more
resistant structure than non-affiliated loans during the global financial crisis. In the light
of that study, analyzing the lender banks and financial institutions, and separating total
cross border loans as affiliated and non-affiliated loans are also crucial.
Firstly, I clarify the partnership structures of banks operated during the time period
of analysis in Turkey. In the second step, I separate non-affiliated and affiliated loans
that are borrowed from the foreign partners by domestic banks. At the end of that
process, I constitute a second dataset, which includes affiliated and non-affiliated loans.
Graph 8 shows the behavior of affiliated and non-affiliated loans with total cross
border bank loans. While the total amount of cross border bank loans was USD 10.79
billion, the total amount and share of affiliated loans was USD 0.84 billion and 7.8
percent as of December 2002, respectively. However, the total amount of cross border
bank loans and affiliated loans reached to USD 137.35 billion and USD 27.65 billion,
respectively. The share of affiliated loans also increased to 20.13 percent during time
period of analysis. The amount of total cross border bank loans and the share of
affiliated loans increased at the same time. Development and globalization of Turkish
banking sector and intense interest of foreign banks to Turkey might lead to such an
increase.
Graph 9 shows the roll over rates of affiliated and non-affiliated loans during the
time period of analysis. There are two important points to underline: The roll over ratio
of affiliated loans is higher than the ratio of non-affiliated loans throughout the period,
and the roll over ratio of affiliated loans did not decrease during the global financial
crisis whereas the ratio of non-affiliated loans decreased up to 74 percent during that
period. Therefore due to this spread between affiliated and non-affiliated loans, I assert
that affiliated loans can be more resilient to conjectural risk perceptions.
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In order to get an empirical answer to the question of whether the lender banks’
characteristics are important with regards to vulnerability or not, I used the following
model with the help of random effects panel estimation method instead of fixed effects.
Analysis covers the period between December 2002 and December 2009, and I divided
this period into pre-crisis and crisis periods. Because of the fact that I separated total
loans as affiliated and non-affiliated, loan type α characterizes the affiliated and non-
affiliated loans in the model. Loan type α is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 for
affiliated loans and 0 for non-affiliated loans.
Because the dependent variable is the yearly logarithmic difference of bank i’s stock
loan amount at time t which is borrowed in type α, it is not possible to use a dummy
variable for loan types with fixed effects method. When I regress with fixed effects, the
dummy variable for affiliated loans omits. Thus, since the structure of the dataset is not
proper for fixed effects estimation, I used random effects estimation instead. Random
effects estimation gives the weighted average ’within’ and ’between estimators’. Key
point in using random effects estimation is the assumption of fixed effects of each bank
are independent from all explanatory variables in all time periods. Therefore, I assume
that θia shown in the model is independent of all explanatory variables in all time
periods.
∆Liα,t = β0 + β1∆(Bank)i,t−1 + β2∆(TrMacro)t−1 + β3∆(Global)t−1
+ β4D1 + β5D2 + β6(D1 ∗D2) + θiα + εiα,t
(4)
where
∆Liα,t: The yearly logarithmic difference of bank i’s stock loan amount at time t,
which is borrowed in type α (affiliated or non-affiliated),
∆(Bank)i,t−1: Yearly difference of bank specific variables of bank i at time t− 1,
∆(TrMacro)t−1: Yearly difference of Turkish Economy’s macroeconomic indicators
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at time t− 1,
∆(Global)t−1: Yearly difference of global liquidity indicators at time t− 1,
D1: Affiliated Loan Dummy,
D2: 2008 Crisis Dummy (for the period of 2008M09 and 2009M09),
(D1 ∗D2): Interaction of Affiliated Loan and 2008 Crisis Dummies
Dependent variable is the yearly logarithmic difference of bank i’s stock loan amount
at time t which is borrowed in type α (affiliated or non-affiliated) because the yearly
logarithmic difference expresses the annual growth approximately. I use yearly log-
arithmic difference instead of logarithmic value since I compare the effects of global
financial crisis on affiliated and non-affiliated loans. If I used logarithmic value of
loans, it could give the amount of changes in both types. However it would be biased
since the amount of non-affiliated loans is so higher than affiliated loans. Therefore,
the percentage changes in both loan types are more meaningful. In the light of that
objective, I add the yearly logarithmic difference as a dependent variable to the model.
To ensure consistency, I also add the yearly difference of independent variables to the
model. Non-affiliated loans represent the control group.
In Table 9, β1 shows the difference between the growth rates of affiliated and non-
affiliated loans during pre-crisis period. β3 shows the difference between the growth
rates of affiliated and non-affiliated loans during crisis period. According to the fourth
regression that includes all the explanatory variables, the growth rate of non-affiliated
loans was larger than the growth rate of affiliated loans by 1.85 percent during pre-
crisis period. The growth rate of affiliated loans was bigger than non-affiliated loans by
0.74 percent during financial crisis, and this result states that affiliated loans are less
affected from 2008 global financial crisis according to non-affiliated loans. Therefore, I
conclude that lender banks’ characteristics with regards to vulnerability are important
and affiliated loans have less vulnerable structure as regards to non-affiliated loans.
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5.3 Could Macro-Prudential Policies in Turkey increase the
resilience of Turkish economy to cross-border bank flows?
After the beginning and spreading of the global financial crisis in 2008, new policy
framework was developed to eliminate systemic risks and thereby to prevent the con-
tagion effects of unfavorable financial conditions to all economies. The importance of
giving a quick reaction equipped with macro-prudential policies to financial crisis has
become evident with recent studies (Bianchi and Mendoza 2011, Jeanne and Korinek
2010). It was clearly understood that uncontrolled structure of financial system and
illegal practices are the main reasons of crisis, and three main results of crisis have led
to the search for new policies:
• Contagion effect of unfavorable financial conditions to all economies is more than
estimated.
• Costs of financial crisis are very high.
• Price stability does not guarantee the financial stability.
Therefore, in order to reduce the negative effects induced from the volatility in
capital flows, Turkey has implemented certain macro-prudential policies and enacted
some regulations since the last quarter of 2010. Targeting financial stability with price
stability, interest rate corridor and reserve option mechanism are some of the examples
of those policies.
Turkey has started to monitor financial stability as well as price stability since
the last quarter of 2010. Although price stability has a concrete definition, financial
stability does not have such a definition, and hence the definition of financial stability
changes from country to country. Therefore, prior and urgent problems of the economy
determine the required policies to ensure financial stability. In Turkey, volatile capital
flows are one of the main and prior problems that threaten financial stability. In order
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to reduce the negative effects induced from the volatility in capital flows, CBRT has
implemented certain macro-prudential policies since the last quarter of 2010. These
policies can be summarized basically as the interest rate corridor, changes in reserve
requirements and Reserve Option Mechanism (ROM).
• Interest rate corridor: Unlike the traditional interest rate policy, the short-term
interest rates can be arranged in daily and weekly frequencies instead of a monthly
frequency (Basci and Kara, 2011). With the help of interest rate corridor;
– CBRT can give quick responses to sudden global changes,
– CBRT can expand interest rate corridor to downward or upward in accor-
dance with the capital flows.
– CBRT can manage credit supply with increasing uncertainty about corridor
and funding amount.
• Required Reserves: CBRT has the option to increase required reserve ratios in
order to prevent financial risk stemmed from volatility in capital flows. Under the
new monetary policy:
– Interest payment application for reserve requirements have terminated,
– Required reserve ratios were differentiated according to the maturity struc-
ture of deposits,
– Financing companies have been included in the reserve requirements system.
• Reserve Option Mechanism (ROM): This mechanism provides an opportunity to
banks holding certain percentage of their TL required reserves as FX and gold.
Strengthening of foreign exchange reserves, providing more flexibility in liquidity
management to banks, and minimizing the volatility risks in exchange rates stem
from capital flows are the main objectives of Reserve Option Mechanism (Alper,
Kara and Yorukoglu (2012).
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CBRT and Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) also took several
macro prudential measures in accordance with the directives of the Financial Stability
Committee.
In order to determine whether macro-prudential policies in Turkey could increase
or not the resilience of Turkish economy to cross-border bank flows, I use the following
model. It is based on the fixed effect panel estimation method and covers the period of
December 2002 - December 2014. The model below is very close to Model 3, and it aims
to separate demand and supply side shocks with the help of fixed effects for borrower
bank, lender country and loan type. However, the source of shocks is not important
in this model, and there is no need to separate demand and supply side shocks since I
only analyze the sensitivity of capital flows to global factors without noticing demand
or supply side. Therefore, I add the fixed effects for each loan type borrowed by each
bank from each country together instead of separating them, which are represented by
γicb in the model.
The sensitivity of cross border bank loans to the behavior of global indicators shows
that any change in global liquidity indicators will lead to volatility in bank flows. Sharp
volatility in bank flows also threaten financial stability. My research question arises at
this point because macro-prudential policies have been applied since late 2010 in order
to ensure financial stability and decrease the magnitude of volatility in capital flows.
Thus, I analyze whether the sensitivity of bank flows to changes in global indicators
have decreased or not since late 2010. Therefore, I add the global liquidity indicators
to the model such as EMBI, US yield curve slope, real credit growth of banks in US
and Euro Area, money supply growth rate of four financial centers, and balance sheet
size of Fed. Since the macro-prudential policies have been implemented since the last
quarter of 2010, I also add a dummy variable, which represent the period of 2010M09
and 2014M12. I then interact dummy variable with each global factor. My focus is on
the double interaction terms given by
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Globalfactor ∗ Post2010 (5)
which give the incremental sensitivity of cross border bank loans to the global factors
from June 2010.
Licb,t = β0 + β1(Global)t−1 + β2D1 + β3((Global)t−1 ∗D1)
+ γicb + εicb,t
(6)
where
Licb,t: Logarithmic value of bank i’s stock cross border loan at time t, which is
borrowed from country c in loan type b,
(Global)i,t−1: The value of global liquidity indicators at time t− 1,
D1: Post2010 dummy variable (for the period of 2010M09 and 2014M12)
((Global)t−1 ∗D1): The interaction of global liquidity indicators at time t − 1 and
Post2010 dummy variable
γicb: The fixed effect for cross border loan of bank i borrowed from country c in loan
type b
Tablo 10 shows the estimation results. In the first regression, I add global liquid-
ity indicators to the analysis as control variables. In the other regressions, I add the
post2010 dummy variable and interactions of global liquidity variable with post2010
dummy variable to the model, respectively. The coefficients of β1 - β6 show the in-
cremental sensitivity of cross border bank loans to the global factors from June 2010.
According to the results in Table 10, the effects of emerging market risk perception
(EMBI), monetary stance of Fed and real credit growth of banks in US and Euro Area
on cross border bank loans have decreased since the last quarter of 2010. However,
there is no significant change in the effects of money supply growth rate and the Fed’s
balance sheet size on cross border bank loans.
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As a result, I conclude that the impacts of global liquidity indicators on cross border
loans diminished and the new policy framework in Turkey has been successful within
the frame of protecting Turkish economy from the volatile bank flows. The results show
that after the implementation of macro-prudential policies, cross-border bank flows in
Turkey have been less sensitive to global factors.
5.4 The Effect of Fed Policies on Cross Border Bank Loans in
Turkey
In order to eliminate the negative results of global financial crisis erupted in 2008,
central banks primarily decreased interest rate, but then due to lack of performance of
those measures, central banks in advanced countries were inclined to launch a quantita-
tive easing process. The main actor in this period was the US Federal Reserve(Fed) and
it provided large amounts of liquidity to the market by using unconventional monetary
policy measures. It also supported markets with various asset purchase program (Table
11). After aforementioned measures, the balance sheet size of Fed, which is the best
indicator of monetary expansion, has reached record levels (last graph of Annex A).
In summary, the effects of Fed’s non-traditional expansionary monetary policies on
the capital flows and cross border bank loans in emerging countries have been among
the hot discussion issues in recent years. In this section, I analyze the effects of Fed’s
balance sheet size, which has changed substantially as a result of quantitative easing
program, on cross border bank loans in Turkey.
In order to determine the effects of Fed policies on cross border bank loans in Turkey,
I use the following model. It is based on the fixed effect panel estimation method and
covers the period of December 2002 - December 2014. The model below is very close
to Model 3, which aims to separate demand and supply side shocks with the help of
fixed effects for borrower bank, lender country and loan type. Adding fixed effects for
lender country to the model enables us to control shocks stemmed from lender country.
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However, it is also fact that the share of US lender banks in total bank loans in Turkey
is so high, and I aim to identify the the effects of US Federal Reserve’s(Fed) policies.
Therefore, I do not add the country fixed effects to the model below as a different from
Model 3. I only control the fixed effects of borrower bank and loan type.
Furthermore, Model 3 identifies the dynamics of cross border bank loans on the
basis of bank-specific, national and global factors. However, the model below aims
to analyze the effects of Fed’s quantitative easing policies on bank flows. Hence, the
first and main explanatory variable of model is the balance sheet size of Fed, which
represents the quantitative easing policies. In addition to that variable, I also add the
national and bank specific factors to model.
Licb,t = β0 + β1(Log(FEDAsset))t−1 + β2(TrMacro)t−1 + β3(Bank)i,t−1
+ γi + δb + εib,t
(7)
where
Licb,t: Logarithmic value of bank i’s stock cross border loan at time t borrowed from
country c in loan type b,
(Log(FEDAsset))t−1: Logarithmic value of the balance sheet size of Fed at time
t− 1,
(TrMacro)t−1: The value of Turkish Economy’s macroeconomic indicators at time
t− 1,
(Bank)i,t−1: The value of bank specific variables of bank i at time t− 1,
γi: Fixed effect for bank i
δb: Fixed effect for loan type b
First, I add the balance sheet size of Fed as a basic explanatory variable to the all
regressions in Table 12. The first regression does not include any fixed effects, but other
regressions control time, bank, lender country and loan type fixed effects, respectively.
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In the fifth regression, which includes all those fixed effects, country specific supply
shocks and loan type shocks are controlled fully. In the sixth model, time and country
fixed effects were controlled as a group in order to control lender country shock in
monthly basis. Therefore, sixth model presents the results in cases where supply side
effects are controlled very strictly. The increase in balance sheet size of Fed increases
the cross border bank loans strongly. That impact is significant at the 1 percent level.
In Table 13, in addition to the balance sheet size of Fed, I add the macroeconomic
indicators of Turkish economy and bank specific variables. All regressions include bor-
rower bank and loan type fixed effects with a constant term. Similarly, the balance
sheet size of Fed has a significant positive impact on the cross border bank loans at 1
percent level which is similar to the results of Table 12. The signs of all macroeconomic
indicators and all global liquidity indicators used in the model appear to be in the ex-
pected direction. According to the result of eighth regression in which all explanatory
variables are added, the real effective exchange rate also affect cross border bank loans
as well as the balance sheet size of Fed. Banks increase their cross border loans as a
result of appreciation of TL. Large banks and banks that have strong capital structure
and high return on asset ratio are borrowing more. In addition, banks that have more
credit in their portfolio are borrowing more from the abroad. I find that banks have
low non-performing loan ratio and high deposit ratio are also borrowing more. Such all
relationships are significant at 1 percent level.
Although Table 13 shows the positive effect of Fed’s balance sheet size on cross
border bank loan, it does not offer a solution to the question of which type of loans is
more affected from the quantitative easing program. Therefore, I add dummy variables
for each loan type to eighth regression in Table 13. Moreover, in order to see the
marginal effects of Fed’s balance sheet size on loan types, I also add the interactions
of balance sheet size of Fed with loan type dummy variables to the model (Table 14).
In the first and second regressions, credits and repo are excluded as a control group,
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respectively. In the first regression, the coefficients of β7 - β10 show the marginal
effect of balance sheet size of Fed on deposits, syndication, securitization and repo
according to credit, respectively. In the second regression, the coefficients of β6 - β9
show the marginal effect of balance sheet size of Fed on credit, deposits, syndication
and securitization according to repo, respectively. The Fed’s balance sheet size has a
significant effect on cross border loan types. Credit, repo, deposits, syndication and
securitization types are affected more from the increase in the Fed’s balance sheet size,
respectively.
I test those results statistically in Table 15a and 15b, respectively. In the first test, I
test interacted variables jointly. According to test results, the null hypothesis is rejected,
and the changes in balance sheet size of Fed affect loan types at the different levels.
In the other tests, I test the effects of Fed’s asset size on each loan types. According
to test results, the null hypotheses are rejected, and the effects of the changes in Fed’s
balance sheet size on each loan types are statistically significant. Moreover, the results
of Table 15b are also similar to Table 15a.
In Table 16, I analyze the channels in which Fed’s asset size affects cross border
bank loans. Therefore, I add the interactions of balance sheet size of Fed with bank
specific variables to the eighth model in Table 13. Table 16 shows that banks that have
relatively small asset sizes, weak capital structures, low return on assets and liquid assets
ratios are affected more from the changes in the Fed’s balance sheet size. I interpret
that case as following: The banks, which could not borrow at the desired level during
illiquid periods due to underwhelming ratios and indicators, started to search for yield
and borrow more with the help of increasing liquidity as a result of Fed’s quantitative
easing process. Therefore, those banks are affected more from the quantitative easing
process.
As a result, I analyze the channels in which Fed’s asset size affects cross border bank
loans and loan types in Turkey. Cross border bank loans have increased as a result of
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quantitative easing programs. Credit, repo, deposits, syndication and securitization
types are affected more from the increase in the Fed’s balance sheet size, respectively.
Moreover, the banks, which have relatively small asset sizes, weak capital structures, low
return on assets and liquid assets ratios, are affected more positively from the changes
in the Fed’s balance sheet size because they could not borrow at the desired level during
illiquid periods but they started to borrow more easily in the liquid environment, which
is the result of Fed’s quantitative easing programs.
6 Conclusion
This paper contribute to the literature on the determinants of cross border bank
loans in Turkey by using bank level dataset. I analyze the determinants of cross bor-
der bank loans in Turkey for the period of December 2002 and December 2014. The
main findings can be summarized as follows: I categorize the main determinants as
bank specific, national and global. Bank specific determinants are banks’ credit ratios,
deposit ratios, return on asset ratios, sizes and FX credit and deposit interest spreads.
Monthly change in Istanbul Stock Exchange repo interest rate is the only indicator
among national variables that affect cross border bank loans. Global determinants are
real credit growth of banks in US and Euro Area, money supply growth rate of four
financial centers, and the balance sheet size of Fed. I also show that there is no sig-
nificant impact of non-performing loan ratio and capital structure of banks on cross
border bank loans as well as monetary policy stance of Fed, global risk appetite, and
risk perception towards emerging markets. That is, banks that large size, high return
on asset ratio, more credit in their portfolio and low deposit ratio are borrowing more,
and only change in BIST over/night repo interest rate among national variables has
significant impact on cross border bank loans.
Secondly, I compare the vulnerabilities of affiliated and non-affiliated loans for the
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pre-crisis and global financial crisis periods. According to the results, the lender banks’
characteristics are important with regards to vulnerability and affiliated loans have less
vulnerable structure than non-affiliated loans.
Thirdly, I analyze whether macro-prudential policies in Turkey could increase or
not the resilience of Turkish economy to cross-border bank flows. According to results,
the impacts of global liquidity indicators on cross border bank loans diminished and
the new policy framework in Turkey has been successful with regards to sharp volatile
bank flows. The results show that after the implementation of macro-prudential policies,
cross-border bank flows in Turkey have been less sensitive to global factors.
Fourth question is about the effects of Fed’s balance sheet size, which is the indi-
cator for quantitative easing programs, on cross border bank loans in Turkey. I also
analyze the channels in which Fed’s balance sheet size affects cross border bank loans
and loan types in Turkey. Cross border bank loans have increased as a result of quan-
titative easing programs. Credit, repo, deposits, syndication and securitization types
are affected more from the quantitative easing programs, respectively. Moreover, the
banks, which have relatively small asset sizes, weak capital structures, low return on
assets and liquid assets ratios, are affected more positively from the quantitative easing
programs because they could not borrow at the desired level during illiquid periods
due to their underwhelming ratios but they started to borrow more easily in the liquid
environment, which was the result of Fed’s quantitative easing programs.
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Graph 1: Private Capital Flows to Emerging Markets by Regions (USD Billion) 
 
Source: Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011). 
 
Graph 2: Private Capital Flows to Emerging Markets (USD Billion) 
 
Source: Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011). Their data sources: BIS Loactional Banking Statistics, Bank Loans (Table 7c), Net 
Bond Issues (Table 11); Foreign Direct Investment from the Global Development Fund; Portfolio equity data from CEIC 
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Graph 3: Composition of Banks' Cross-Border Loans (Billion US Dollar) 
 
 
 
Graph 4: Banks' Cross-Border Loan Typess (Billion US Dollar) 
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Graph 5: Banks' Roll-Over Rate (%)
 
 
 
 
Graph 6: Currency Distribution of Banks' 
Cross-Border Loans (%) 
Graph 7: The share of regions (%) 
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Table 1: Banks included in the analysis 
Bank Code Bank Name Bank Code Bank Name Bank Code Bank Name 
10 Ziraat Bankası 64 İş Bankası 111 Finansbank 
12 Halk Bankası 67 YKB 123 Hsbc Bank 
15 Vakıfbank 99 Ing Bank 124 Alternatifbank 
32 TEB 103 Fibabanka 125 Burgan Bank 
46 Akbank 108 Turkland 134 Denizbank 
59 Şekerbank 109 Tekstil 135 Anadolubank 
62 Garanti Bankası 
   
 
Table 2: Variable Definitions and Sources 
Variables Definition Sources 
Dependent Variable   
Log cross-border bank loans 
Log of bank i's loan at time t which is borrowed from country 
c in loan type b  
BRSA-CBRT 
Bank-Specific Variables   
Log(real asset) Logarithmic value of banks’ real asset size  BRSA-CBRT 
Credit over asset Credits/Total Asset BRSA-CBRT 
Deposit Over asset Deposits/Total Assets BRSA-CBRT 
Capital over asset Paid Capital / Total Assets BRSA-CBRT 
Return on Asset (ROA) Return / Total Assets BRSA-CBRT 
NPL Ratio Non-performing loans / Total credits BRSA-CBRT 
Spread Difference between interest rate of FX credit and FX deposit BRSA-CBRT 
Liquid assets over Assets 
Selected FX Liquid Assets: Cash+ Foreign Banks (free)+ 
Required reserves kept in line with the ROM.  
Liquid assets over Assets = Selected FX Liquid Assets/Total 
assets 
BRSA-CBRT 
   
TR Macro Variables   
▲Industrial Production  
Monthly Change in Industrial Production, used instead of 
GDP due to discrepancy of frequencies  
Turkstat 
CPI Growth Inflation based on CPI Turkstat 
▲BIST o/n Interest Rate 
Monthly Change in Istanbul Stock Exchange Over/night 
interest rate 
Bloomberg 
REER Reel effective exchange rate based on CPI CBRT 
CDS Credit default swap Bloomberg 
Global Liquidity Variables   
EMBI 
Emerging market bond index which is prepared by JP 
Morgan 
Bloomberg 
VIX CBOE S&P500 Volatility VIX Bloomberg 
US yield curve slope 10 year/3 month US Treasury yield spread Bloomberg 
US real credit growth Real private credit Bloomberg 
EA real credit growth Real private credit Bloomberg 
Total M2 growth  
Growth rate of US, ECB, United Kingdom and Japan’s total 
M2 in USD currency 
Bloomberg 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Variables 
            
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log(real asset) 114795 11.72 1.67 2.80 13.80 
Credit over asset 114795 0.51 0.15 0.00 0.95 
Deposit Over asset 114795 0.51 0.20 0.00 1.02 
Capital over asset 114795 0.06 0.08 0.00 5.47 
ROA 108797 1.87 2.03 -112.41 50.41 
NPL 114465 1.24 4.80 0.00 100.00 
Spread 102980 2.68 1.20 -2.03 17.34 
Liquid assets over Assets 114795 35.13 15.01 0.00 99.00 
Monthly Change in Industrial Production  113862 0.83 8.45 -25.07 25.08 
CPI Growth 114795 9.26 4.09 4.00 31.70 
Monthly Change in BIST o/n Interest 
Rate 
114740 0.00 10.80 -43.92 43.92 
REER 114330 114.41 8.40 89.00 132.00 
CDS 114795 170.09 151.22 52.60 1217.86 
EMBI 114795 333.50 119.94 157.88 774.32 
VIX 114795 19.54 8.59 10.42 59.89 
US yield curve slope 114795 2.04 1.10 -0.50 3.67 
US real credit growth 114795 5.60 4.00 -5.60 12.31 
EA real credit growth 114177 0.00 0.01 -0.07 0.31 
Total M2 growth  114177 0.00 0.01 -0.06 0.45 
Log(Fed Asset) 114795 14.38 0.66 13.49 15.32 
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Table 6: Determinants of Banks’ Cross Border Loan (Bank + TR Macro Variables) 
            
Dependent Variable Log of bank i's total loans from country c in loan type b at time t 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Bank-Specific Variables           
Log(Real Assets)_{t-1} 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Credit over asset_{t-1} 1.57*** 1.56*** 1.59*** 1.59*** 1.59*** 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) 
Deposit over asset_{t-1} -1.23*** -1.24*** -1.24*** -1.23*** -1.20*** 
 
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Capital over asset{t-1} -0.24 -0.23 -0.21 -0.18 -0.05 
 
(0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.40) (0.40) 
Return on asset_{t-1} 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Npl ratio_{t-1} -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Spread_{t-1} -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
TR Macro Variables 
     Industrial Production Growth_{t-1} -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
CPI Growth_{t-1}  
 
0.38 0.18 0.18 0.41 
 
 (0.42) (0.43) (0.43) (0.44) 
BIST o/n_{t-1} 
  
0.17** 0.17** 0.18** 
 
  
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
REER_{t-1} 
   
-0.04 -0.09 
 
   
(0.10) (0.10) 
CDS_{t-1} 
    
-0.02** 
 
    
(0.01) 
Constant Term 4.95*** 4.88*** 4.75*** 4.78*** 4.80*** 
 
(0.33) (0.34) (0.34) (0.35) (0.35) 
Fixed Effect ICB FE ICB FE ICB FE ICB FE ICB FE 
Observations 81,232 81,232 81,214 81,214 81,214 
R-squared 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 
Notes: The table reports the estimates of panel regressions with bank, lender country and loan type fixed effects(ICB FE) and 
clustered standard errors at the borrower bank level. The dependent variable is logarithmic value of bank i's total loans from 
country c in loan type b at time t. All are reported in two decimal places.  I winsorized all variables at the 1% level in both 
tails of the distribution. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1 
percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent, respectively. 
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Table 7: Determinants of Banks’ Cross Border Loan (Bank + TR Macro + Global Variables) 
                  
Dependent Variable Logarithmic value of bank i's total loans from country c in loan type b at time t 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Bank-Specific Variables                 
Log(Real Assets)_{t-1} 0.50*** 0.51*** 0.50*** 0.52*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.43*** 0.44*** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Credit over asset_{t-1} 1.59*** 1.59*** 1.59*** 1.61*** 1.63*** 1.64*** 1.41*** 1.41*** 
 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) 
Deposit over asset_{t-1} -1.20*** -1.19*** -1.21*** -1.19*** -1.19*** -1.20*** -1.04*** -1.03*** 
 
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) 
Capital over asset{t-1} -0.06 0.03 -0.03 0.08 0.10 0.04 0.18 0.22 
 
(0.40) (0.41) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.41) (0.41) 
Return on asset_{t-1} 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Npl ratio_{t-1} -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Spread_{t-1} -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
TR Macro Variables 
        Industrial Production 
Growth_{t-1} -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
CPI Growth_{t-1}  0.46 0.35 0.23 0.05 0.04 0.14 -0.03 -0.05 
 
(0.44) (0.44) (0.47) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) 
BIST o/n_{t-1} 0.19** 0.18** 0.18** 0.15* 0.15* 0.14* 0.19** 0.19** 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
REER_{t-1} -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 0.02 0.05 
 
(0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) 
CDS_{t-1} -0.37*** -0.11 -0.34** -0.33** -0.33** -0.32** -0.14 -0.08 
 
(0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Global Liquidity Variables 
        EMBI_{t-1} 0.02 
 
0.02* 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.00 
 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
 
VIX_{t-1} 
 
-0.16 
     
-0.10 
 
 
(0.13) 
     
(0.14) 
US yield curve slope_{t-1} 
  
-1.37 0.22 0.58 0.52 -0.54 -0.72 
 
  
(0.94) (1.21) (1.21) (1.21) (1.24) (1.20) 
US real credit growth_{t-1} 
   
0.65** 0.67** 0.64** 1.18*** 1.10*** 
 
   
(0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.36) (0.36) 
EA real credit growth_{t-1} 
    
5.94*** 5.42*** 5.68*** 5.73*** 
 
    
(2.07) (2.06) (2.06) (2.06) 
M2 growth_{t-1} 
     
2.47** 2.64*** 2.67*** 
 
     
(0.98) (0.98) (0.98) 
Log(FED asset)_{t-1} 
      
0.15*** 0.14*** 
 
      
(0.04) (0.03) 
Constant 4.78*** 4.63*** 4.70*** 4.39*** 4.29*** 4.24*** 3.35*** 3.29*** 
 
(0.35) (0.38) (0.36) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.46) (0.46) 
Fixed Effect ICB FE ICB FE ICB FE ICB FE ICB FE ICB FE ICB FE ICB FE 
Observations 81,214 81,214 81,214 81,214 81,214 81,214 81,214 81,214 
R-squared 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 
Notes: The table reports the estimates of panel regressions with bank, lender country and loan type fixed effects(ICB FE) and 
clustered standard errors at the borrower bank level. The dependent variable is logarithmic value of bank i's total loans from 
country c in loan type b at time t. All are reported in two decimal places.  I winsorized all variables at the 1% level in both 
tails of the distribution. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1 
percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent, respectively. 
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Table 8: Standardized Beta Coefficients 
Dependent Variable Log of bank i's total loans from country c in loan type b at time t 
Independent Variables    
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Rankings 
Bank-Specific Variables         
Log(Real Assets)_{t-1}  0.44*** 0.1876 1 1 
 
(0.04) 
 
    
Credit over asset_{t-1} 1.41*** 0.0514 2 2 
 
(0.13) 
 
    
Deposit over asset_{t-1} -1.03*** -0.0239 3 4 
 
(0.15) 
 
    
Paid Capital over asset{t-1} 0.22 0.0023 -  - 
 
(0.41) 
 
    
Return on asset_{t-1} 0.03*** 0.0120 5 7 
 
(0.01) 
 
    
Npl ratio_{t-1} -0.02 -0.0052 -  - 
 
(0.02) 
 
    
Spread btw YP deposit and credit_{t-1} -0.04*** -0.0146 4 6 
 
(0.01) 
 
    
TR Macro Variables 
  
    
Industrial Production Growth_{t-1} 0.03 0.0009 - - 
 
(0.08) 
 
    
CPI Growth_{t-1} -0.05 -0.0003 - - 
 
(0.48) 
 
    
BIST o/n_{t-1}  0.19** 0.0059 - - 
 
(0.09) 
 
    
REER_{t-1} 0.05 0.0014 - - 
 
(0.11) 
 
    
CDS_{t-1} -0.08 -0.0024 - - 
 
(0.15) 
 
    
Global Liquidity Variables 
  
    
VIX_{t-1} -0.10 -0.0030 - -  
 
(0.14) 
 
    
US yield curve slope_{t-1} -0.72 -0.0027 - -  
 
(1.20) 
 
    
EA real credit growth_{t-1} 1.10*** 0.0149 2 5 
 
(0.36) 
 
    
US real credit growth_{t-1} 5.73*** 0.0079 3 8 
 
(2.06) 
 
    
M2 growth_{t-1} 2.67*** 0.0077 4 9 
 
(0.98) 
 
    
Log(FED asset)_{t-1} 0.14*** 0.0312 1 3 
 
(0.03) 
 
    
Constant 3.29*** 
 
    
 
(0.46) 
 
    
Fixed Effects ICB FE       
Observations 81,214 
 
    
R-squared 0.57       
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Graph 8: Banks' Cross-Border Loans (Total-Affiliated-Non-Affiliated) 
 
 
 
Graph 9: Banks' Roll-Over Rate(%) 
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Table 9: Fragility of cross border loan types (affiliated or non-affiliated)  
for pre-crisis and 2008 crisis periods 
 Dependent Variable Yearly log difference of bank i's loan in type a at time t 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Independent Variables Random Effects Random Effects Random Effects Random Effects 
  Bank-Specific Variables         
 Real asset growth_{t-1} 
 
-0.05 -0.04 -0.04 
 
  
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
 Credit over asset _{t-1} 
 
-0.28 -0.47 -0.63 
 
  
(0.53) (0.58) (0.59) 
 Deposit over asset _{t-1} 
 
-1.01** -1.14** -1.06** 
 
  
(0.47) (0.53) (0.54) 
 Asset over equity _{t-1} 
 
0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 
 
  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 Return on asset _{t-1} 
 
-0.01 0.00 -0.00 
 
  
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
 Npl ratio _{t-1} 
 
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
  
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
 TR Macro Variables     
 Industrial Production growth_{t-1}  
  
1.80* 1.67 
 
   
(1.00) (1.09) 
 CPI Growth_{t-1} 
  
-1.33 -1.33 
 
   
(1.12) (1.09) 
 REER _{t-1} 
  
0.26 0.46 
 
   
(0.43) (0.41) 
 BIST o/n interest _{t-1} 
  
0.24 0.41 
 
   
(0.65) (0.64) 
 Global Variables     
 EMBI _{t-1} 
   
-0.40** 
 
    
(0.36) 
 US yield curve slope _{t-1} 
   
-1.93 
 
    
(8.46) 
 US real credit growth_{t-1} 
   
2.11 
 
    
(1.85) 
 EA real credit growth _{t-1} 
   
-3.93 
 
    
(2.76) 
 M2 growth _{t-1} 
   
-0.24 
 
    
(0.94) 
𝐵1 Affiliated Loan dummy -1.38*** -1.85*** -1.84*** -1.85*** 
 
 
(0.37) (0.39) (0.38) (0.38) 
𝐵2 2008 crisis dummy -0.46*** -0.40** -0.42** -0.38** 
 
 
(0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.19) 
𝐵3 Affiliated Loan*2008 crisis 0.70*** 0.71*** 0.74*** 0.74*** 
 
 
(0.23) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
 Constant 0.06 0.23 0.26 0.23 
 
 
(0.19) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) 
 Fixed Effect No No No No 
 Observations 4,485 3,577 3,249 3,247 
 Number of y 87 77 77 77 
Notes: The table reports the estimates of panel regressions with random effects and clustered standard errors at the borrower 
bank level. All are reported in two decimal places.  I winsorized all variables at the 1% level in both tails of the distribution. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, 
and * at 10 percent, respectively. 
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Table 11: Quantitative easing programs which were announced by Fed 
Date Fed Explanation 
November 2008  QE 1 First Quantitative Easing Pack including 600 billion US dollars of bond purchases 
March 2009  QE 1 Extension 
As a continuation of QE 1, purchasing mortgage-based securities and bond in the 
amount of 750 and 300 billion US dollars, respectively. 
November 2010  QE 2 
Second Quantitative Easing Pack including 600 billion US dollars of bond 
purchases  
September 2011  Operation Twist 
Changing short term bond(less than 3 years) with long term bond(6-30 years). Total 
amount of program is 400 billion USD dollars  
June 2012  
Operation Twist 
Extension 
Within the frame of Operation Twist, additional bond exchange in the amount of 
267 billion USD dollars  
September 2012  QE 3 
Third Quantitative Easing Pack including 40 billion US dollars of mortgage-backed 
bonds and 45 billion US dollars of treasury bond in monthly 
May 2013 QE 3 Fed Tapering Announcements was made by Ben Bernanke  
October 2014  QE 3 End of QE 3 
 
 
 
Table 12: The balance sheet size of Fed and cross border bank loans in Turkey 
              
Dependent Variable Log of bank i's loan from country c in loan type b at time t 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log(FED Asset)_{t-1}  0.81*** 1.40*** 1.66*** 1.93*** 2.03*** 0.23 
 
(0.13) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.28) 
Constant 3.97*** 0.11 -2.46* -1.81 -1.79 7.38*** 
 
(0.81) (1.24) (1.29) (1.23) (1.16) (1.75) 
Fixed Effect No Time 
Time and 
Bank 
Time, Bank 
and Country 
Time, Bank, 
Country and 
Loan Type 
Time, Bank, 
Country and 
Loan Type 
Observations 89,636 89,636 89,636 89,636 89,636 89,636 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.38 0.55 0.59 
Notes: The table reports the estimates of panel regressions with different fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the 
borrower bank level. The dependent variable is logarithmic value of bank i's loan from country c in loan type b at time t. All 
are reported in two decimal places.  I winsorized all variables at the 1% level in both tails of the distribution. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, 
and * at 10 percent, respectively. 
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Table 13: The balance sheet size of Fed and cross border bank loans in Turkey 
Dependent Variable Log of bank i's loan in loan type b at time t 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log(FED asset)_{t-1} 1.03*** 0.42*** 0.15*** 0.09 0.09 0.14** 0.14** 0.14** 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
TR Macro Variables 
        
Industrial Production Growth_{t-1} -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
CPI Growth_{t-1} 0.13 0.03 0.15 0.13 0.02 -0.03 0.24 0.36 
 
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) 
REER_{t-1} 1.13*** 0.91*** 0.65*** 0.71*** 0.63*** 0.66*** 0.48*** 0.39*** 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) 
BIST o/n_{t-1} 2.53*** 1.58*** 0.97 0.90 0.99 0.94 0.80 0.78 
 
(0.58) (0.59) (0.59) (0.59) (0.61) (0.61) (0.61) (0.61) 
CDS_{t-1} -0.47*** -0.22*** -0.09 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.09 -0.15 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Bank-Specific Variables 
        
Log(Real Assets)_{t-1} 
 
0.45*** 0.43*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.49*** 
  
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Credit over asset_{t-1} 
  
1.18*** 1.10*** 1.22*** 1.14*** 2.08*** 1.93*** 
   
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.25) (0.25) 
Deposit over asset_{t-1} 
   
-0.79*** -0.73*** -0.67*** -0.78*** -0.64*** 
    
(0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) 
Return on asset_{t-1} 
    
0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
     
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Npl ratio_{t-1} 
     
-0.04*** -0.03 -0.05** 
      
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Liquid Asset over Total Asset_{t-1} 
      
0.01*** 0.01*** 
       
(0.00) (0.00) 
Capital over asset{t-1} 
       
-2.06*** 
        
(0.39) 
Constant 2.19*** 0.15 2.21*** 2.75*** 2.73*** 2.56*** 1.89*** 1.33*** 
 
(0.25) (0.28) (0.33) (0.34) (0.35) (0.36) (0.40) (0.42) 
Fixed Effect IB FE IB FE IB FE IB FE IB FE IB FE IB FE IB FE 
Observations 88,693 88,693 87,821 87,821 84,500 84,500 84,500 84,500 
R-squared 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 
Notes: The table reports the estimates of panel regressions with bank and loan type fixed effects(IB FE) and clustered 
standard errors at the borrower bank level. The dependent variable is logarithmic value of bank i's loan in loan type b at time 
t. All are reported in two decimal places.  I winsorized all variables at the 1% level in both tails of the distribution. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, 
and * at 10 percent, respectively. 
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Table 14: The balance sheet size of Fed and cross border bank loans in Turkey 
 Dependent Variable Log of bank i's loan in loan type b at time t 
 Independent Variables (1) (2) 
 Log(FED asset)_{t-1} 0.78*** 0.48*** 
 
 
(0.07) (0.14) 
 TR Macro Variables 
   Industrial Production Growth_{t-1} -0.04 -0.04 
 
 
(0.09) (0.09) 
 CPI Growth_{t-1} 0.36 0.36 
 
 
(0.49) (0.49) 
 REER_{t-1} 0.23* 0.23* 
 
 
(0.12) (0.12) 
 BIST o/n_{t-1} 0.73 0.73 
 
 
(0.62) (0.62) 
 CDS_{t-1} -0.22** -0.22** 
 
 
(0.10) (0.10) 
 Bank-Specific Variables 
   Log(Real Assets)_{t-1} 0.38*** 0.38*** 
 
 
(0.04) (0.04) 
 Credit over asset_{t-1} 2.41*** 2.41*** 
 
 
(0.25) (0.25) 
 Deposit over asset_{t-1} -0.59*** -0.59*** 
 
 
(0.16) (0.16) 
 Return on asset_{t-1} 0.03*** 0.03*** 
 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
 Npl ratio_{t-1} -0.05** -0.05** 
 
 
(0.02) (0.02) 
 Liquid Asset over Total Asset_{t-1} 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
 Paid Capital over asset{t-1} 1.48*** 1.48*** 
 
 
(0.39) (0.39) 
 Dummy Variables for Loan Types 
  𝐵1 Credit dummy 
 
-3.41*** 
 
  
(0.86) 
𝐵2 Deposit dummy 2.48*** -0.93 
 
 
(0.51) (0.92) 
𝐵3 Syndicated dummy 5.40*** 1.98** 
 
 
(0.34) (0.84) 
𝐵4 Securitization dummy 6.62*** 3.21*** 
 
 
(0.97) (1.24) 
𝐵5 Repo dummy 3.41*** 
  
 
(0.86) 
  Interacted Variables 
  𝐵6 Log(FED asset)*Credit dummy 
 
0.30** 
 
  
(0.13) 
𝐵7 Log(FED asset)*Deposit dummy -0.92*** -0.61*** 
 
 
(0.08) (0.14) 
𝐵8 Log(FED asset)*Syndicated dummy -0.89*** -0.59*** 
 
 
(0.05) (0.13) 
𝐵9 Log(FED asset)*Securitization dummy -0.77*** -0.47** 
 
 
(0.15) (0.19) 
𝐵10 Log(FED asset)*Repo dummy -0.30** 
  
 
(0.13) 
  Constant -1.28*** 2.13** 
 
 
(0.47) (0.90) 
 Fixed Effect ICB FE   
 Observations 82,929 82,929 
 R-squared 0.40 0.40 
Notes: The table reports the estimates of panel regressions with bank and loan type fixed effects(IB FE) and clustered 
standard errors at the borrower bank level. The dependent variable is logarithmic value of bank i's loan from country c in loan 
type b at time t. All are reported in two decimal places.  I winsorized all variables at the 1% level in both tails of the 
distribution. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1 percent, ** 
at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent, respectively. 
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Tablo 15a: F-tests for sensitivity to FED (For the first regression in Table 13) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tablo 15b: F-tests for sensitivity to FED (For the second regression in Table 13) 
                
 
 
 
 
Null Hypothesis F Value p-value 
𝐵7 +  𝐵8 +  𝐵9 +  𝐵10 = 0 113.73 0.0000 
𝐵2 +  𝐵7 = 0 13.23 0.0003 
𝐵3 +  𝐵8 = 0 248.04 0.0000 
𝐵4 +  𝐵9 = 0 50.70 0.0000 
𝐵5 +  𝐵10 = 0 18.60 0.0000 
  
 
Null Hypothesis F Value p-value 
𝐵6 +  𝐵7 +  𝐵8 +  𝐵9 = 0 6.43 0.0112 
𝐵1 +  𝐵6 = 0 18.60 0.0000 
𝐵2 +  𝐵7 = 0 3.98 0.0461 
𝐵3 +  𝐵8 = 0 3.87 0.0492 
𝐵4 +  𝐵9 = 0 6.88 0.0087 
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Table 16: The balance sheet size of Fed and cross border bank loans in Turkey 
 
Dependent Variable Log of bank i's loan in loan type b at time t 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(FED asset)_{t-1} 0.59** 1.06*** 0.87** 1.89*** 
 
(0.25) (0.34) (0.35) (0.37) 
TR Macro Variables 
    Industrial Production Growth_{t-1} -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
CPI Growth_{t-1} 0.15 0.12 -0.16 -0.35 
 
(0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) 
REER_{t-1} 0.47*** 0.46*** 0.60*** 0.66*** 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
BIST o/n_{t-1} 0.85 0.84 0.93 0.97 
 
(0.60) (0.60) (0.60) (0.60) 
CDS_{t-1} -0.19** -0.19** -0.18* -0.15 
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Bank Specific Variables 
    Log(Real Assets)_{t-1} 0.66*** 0.83*** 0.58*** 0.85*** 
 
(0.13) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) 
Credit over asset_{t-1} 2.08*** 2.17*** 2.19*** 2.52*** 
 
(0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) 
Deposit over asset_{t-1} -0.90*** -0.86*** -0.73*** -0.83*** 
 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Return on asset_{t-1} 0.02*** 0.02*** 1.00*** 0.66*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.18) (0.20) 
Npl ratio_{t-1} -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Liquid Asset over Total Asset_{t-1} 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.10*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) 
Paid Capital over asset{t-1} -0.03 10.89** 8.22* 12.20** 
 
(0.28) (4.73) (4.79) (4.81) 
Interacted Variables 
    Log(FED asset)*Log(Real Assets)_{t-1} -0.04** -0.07*** -0.03 -0.08*** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Log(FED asset)*Paid Capital over asset_{t-1} 
 
-1.76** -1.32* -1.96** 
  
(0.77) (0.78) (0.79) 
Log(FED asset)*Return on asset_{t-1} 
  
-0.16*** -0.11*** 
   
(0.03) (0.03) 
Log(FED asset)*Liquid Asset over Total Asset_{t-1} 
   
-0.01*** 
    
(0.00) 
Constant 0.08 -2.68 -1.50 -7.75*** 
 
(1.47) (2.01) (2.03) (2.20) 
Fixed Effect IB FE IB FE IB FE IB FE 
Observations 94,861 94,861 94,861 94,861 
R-squared 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 
Notes: The table reports the estimates of panel regressions with bank and loan type fixed effects(IB FE) and clustered 
standard errors at the borrower bank level. The dependent variable is logarithmic value of bank i's loan in loan type b at time 
t. All are reported in two decimal places.  I winsorized all variables at the 1% level in both tails of the distribution. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, 
and * at 10 percent, respectively. 
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Annex A: Time series charts of the Turkish Economy’s macroeconomic and global liquidity 
indicators 
Industrial production index Monthly Change in industrial production 
 
 
Inflation (%)(CPI Growth) BIST over/night interest rate 
  
Real effective exchange rate(REER) Credit default swap(CDS) 
  
Volatility in S&P index(VIX) Emerging market bond index(EMBI) 
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Annex A: (continued) 
US yield curve slope Real Growth of US Credits 
  
Real Growth of Euro Area Credits Total Money Supply(M2) Growth of US, EA, UK, JP 
  
Balance Sheet Size of FED (Billion Dollar)  
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